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Abstract: This paper examines the sustainability of the currency board arrangements 
in Argentina and Hong Kong. We employ a Markov switching model with two 
regimes to infer the exchange rate pressure due to economic fundamentals and market 
expectations. The empirical results suggest  that economic fundamentals and 
expectations are key determinants of a currency board’s sustainability. We also show 
that the government’s credibility played a more important role in Argentina than in 
Hong Kong. The trade surplus, real exchange rate and inflation rate were  more 
important drivers of the sustainability of the Hong Kong currency board. 
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1 Introduction 
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) find that a fixed exchange rate is a popular choice of 
exchange rate policy for developing economies.
3
There are three reasons for looking into the exchange rate arrangements of these 
two economies. First,  evidence suggests that currency boards  postively  impact 
economic performance. Kwan and Lui (1999) argue that currency boards tend to 
reduce inflation but at the expense of slower output growth. Ghosh et al. (2000) find 
that currency boards are associated with better inflation performance and higher 
output growth. Calomiris and Powell (2001) argue that the Argentine currency board 
fostered the development of the financial system. Second, similar to Schmukler and 
Serven (2002), the richness of the history of these two economies enhances our 
understanding of the impacts of domestic and international events on exchange rate 
devaluation pressures. Finally, these two economies offer longer and more numerous 
data series than other economies that have had a currency board (such as Bulgaria, 
Estonia and Lithuania), which is desirable for performing empirical analysis.
  Maintaining a stable and sustainable 
fixed exchange rate system then becomes an important economic policy. There is an 
immense literature (for example: Krugman, 1979; Flood and Garber, 1984) on the 
determinants of a stable fixed exchange rate system. However, theory has far 
outpaced empirics (for some notable exceptions see Jeanne and Masson, 2000; and 
Bonet et al., 2005). This paper attempts to enrich the literature by examining the 
sustainability of the currency board arrangements, which is the strongest form of de 
jure fixed exchange rate, in Argentina and Hong Kong. 
 
4
Our empirical strategy makes inferences about the government’s credibility of 
currency boards based on the interest rate differential between the adopting country 
and the governing country as well as the economic fundamentals in the adopting 
country.  The government’s credibility is defined as the perceived willingness to 
enforce the currency board, conditional on economic fundamentals. Employing the 
Markov switching model proposed in Hamilton (1989), we decompose the pressure 
 
 
                                                 
3  We aim to contribute to the literature on maintaining fixed exchange rate regimes, but we do not aim 
to participate in the debate over the choice of the exchange rate. For the literature on the choice of 
exchange rate regime, see Fischer (2001) and references therein. 
4  The exchange rate regimes of these three economies were affected by the creation of Euro in 1999 
and making empirical analysis problematic.   3 
on maintaining the currency board (as measured by the interest rate differential) into 
two factors: economic fundamentals and market expectations about the strength of the 
currency board. Specifically, we assume that market expectations are stochastic with 
two possible realizations at any point in time:  “credible/no devaluation pressure” 
(henceforth good state) and “non-credible/high devaluation pressure” (henceforth bad 
state).  We also assume that market expectations are  unobserved by the 
econometrician. 
 
Our results indicate self-fulfilling equilibria in both economies. We argue that 
economic fundamentals and expectations are key determinants of the sustainability of 
currency boards. We estimate the Markov transition matrix between (good and bad) 
states for each economy and compute the expected duration of exchange rate regimes 
in each state. We find that once the Hong Kong currency board gains credibility, they 
are able to stay credible for longer than the Argentine board on average.. Finally, we 
show that the relative importance of market expectations and economic fundamentals 
is different in these two countries.    Market expectations play a more important role 
in maintaining the currency board in Argentina than in Hong Kong.    Economic 
fundamentals, including the trade surplus, real exchange rate and inflation rate are 
more important for the sustainability of the Hong Kong currency board. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature on the sustainability of fixed exchange 
rate regimes. Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984) argue that economic 
fundamentals are the key determinants in maintaining a fixed exchange rate regime. 
On the other hand, Obstfeld (1996) argues that expectations play a more important 
role. Rivera-Batiz and Sy (2000) argue that the effectiveness of currency boards relies 
on their credibility. Following Jeanne and Masson (2000), we nest these two classes 
of models in a unified framework to analyze the relevance of these two types of 
factors in determining the success of currency board. Bonet et al. (2005) investigate 
the sustainability of the Argentine currency board using a Markov switching model).  
We do a similar analysis for Argentina.    Our main contribution is to extend this type 
of anlaysis to Hong Kong in order to draw  more  general conclusions and policy 
suggestions for ensuring the sustainability of a currency board. 
 
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the   4 
institutional background of Hong Kong and Argentina. Section 3 describes the data 
and the estimation methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 
concludes.   
 
2 Institutional and Historical Background 
Currency board arrangements stipulate that the domestic currency is fully 
covered by the central bank's holdings of foreign exchange. Among alternative types 
of fixed exchange rate systems, currency boards are the most rigid form. 
Consequently, they should provide the highest degree of exchange rate stability. Hong 
Kong (in 1983), Argentina (in 1991) and Bulgaria (in 1997) adopted currency boards 
in order to stabilize their currencies and financial markets. Furthermore, Estonia (in 
1992) and Lithuania (in 1995) adopted currency boards and issued new currencies 
upon declaring independence in order to facilitate their integration into the global 
economy. Table 1 summarizes the years of operation of the currency boards in these 
countries and the respective governing currencies. Since we focus on the currency 
boards of Argentina and Hong Kong in this paper, we will provide a brief historical 
background of these two currency boards in the remaining part of this section.
5
Home 
 
 
Table 1: Choice of governing currency and years of operation 
Governing Currency  Year 
Argentina  US  1991-2001 
HK  US  1983-Present 
Bulgaria  DM/Euro  1997-1999 (DM) 
1999-present (Euro) 
Estonia  DM/Euro  1992-1999(DM) 
1999-Present (Euro) 
Lithuania  US/Euro  1995-2001 (US) 
2001-Present (Euro) 
 
 
Argentina adopted its currency board in 1991 and continued its operation until 
2001. Prior to the adoption of the currency board system, Argentina experienced very 
                                                 
5  See Latter (2007) and Greenwood (2008) for recent reviews of the currency board of Hong Kong.   5 
high rates of inflation and slow economic growth. Inflation approached 3,000% in 
1989 and 2,300% in 1990, and the government ran a fiscal deficit of 7.6% of GDP. To 
regain the declining value of Argentine Peso, the Argentine government decided to 
peg the value of the Peso to the US dollar in April 1991 at the rate of 1Peso/1US$ 
through a currency board arrangement. The motivation for the currency board was to 
improve the credibility of the government’s disinflation policy. The hope was that the 
rigidity of a currency board arrangment would provide an immediate boost to the 
government’s credibility and help to curb the exorbitant inflation.  Under the 
convertibility law, the central bank was required to hold enough reserves in the form 
of gold, US dollars , or US dollar-denominated bonds to cover (at least) 100% of base 
money.   
 
Under the currency board, inflation gradually declined to less than 1% after 1996, 
and real GDP growth averaged  about 3% during the 1990s. The peg had been 
operating successfully for nearly ten years by the middle of 2001. The Argentine crisis 
in 2001 caused the credibility of the currency board to deteriorate and rekindled 
interest in understanding the determinants of the sustainability of currency board 
systems. Moreover, it cast doubt on the currency board arrangement as a suitable 
fixed exchange rate system in a highly integrated world economy with massive flows 
of capital. 
 
After the collapse of the silver standard in 1935, Hong Kong adopted its first 
currency board arrangement. Due in part to its status as a British colony at the time, 
the governing currency of this arrangement was the Pound Sterling. This regime was 
in place for nearly forty years, until 1973, interrupted only during Hong Kong’s 
occupation by Japan from 1941 to 1945. By the early 1970s, the ongoing depreciation 
of the Pound Sterling motivated Hong Kong to switch the governing currency to the 
US dollar. However, this switch failed to halt the depreciation of the Hong Kong 
dollar relative to other currencies, and as a result the Hong Kong government allowed 
the Hong Kong dollar to float until 1983. 
   
Owing to weak economic fundamentals and the uncertainty created by the 
Sino-British negotiations over the sovereignty of Hong Kong in 1983, the HK dollar 
fell from 5.13 HK$/1US$ in 1981 to $9.8 HK$/1US$ in 1983. Private investors were   6 
in doubt about the business environment that would result when sovereignty was 
returned, from Britain to China. This induced capital outflows and slow-down in 
investment in Hong Kong. The British government decided to fix the value of the 
Hong Kong dollar to the US dollar at the rate of 7.78HK$/1 US$ through a currency 
board arrangement. Since then, the currency board in Hong Kong has remained 
effective up to the present. 
 
In Hong Kong, there was no monetary authority until 1993, and monetary policy 
duties were shared by other institutions. In July 1988, “new accounting arrangements” 
were established that required Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) 
to keep an amount of reserve deposits equivalent to its net clearing balance in the 
Exchange Fund. The Exchange Fund is, in short, the reserve fund held by the Hong 
Kong government to ensure the full convertibility between the Hong Kong dollar and 
the US dollar. It ensures that there is enough currency to clear the money market in 
order to prevent speculative attacks on the Hong Kong dollar. After the establishment 
of Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) in April 1993, the Exchange Fund Bills 
and Exchange Fund Notes were issued to enhance open market operations. The 
Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) was set up in June 1992, and the HKMA acting 
as lender of last resort began to provide short-term liquidity to banks in trouble 
through collateral lending. The LAF rate reflects Hong Kong’s monetary stance on 
the foreign exchange market. 
 
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data  on Argentina and Hong Kong is obtained from the International 
Financial Statistics  (maintained  by the International Monetary Fund). The sample 
period for Argentina is 1991-2001 and for Hong Kong, it is 1984-2005, and the data is 
quarterly. The primary variable of interest should be, in principle, the probability of 
devaluation, π. However, since we do not observe the probability of devaluation in 
reality, we use the  expected rate of depreciation  as an indicator of devaluation 
pressure. As in Svensson (1993) and Jeanne and Masson (2000), we use the interest 
rate differential between the domestic economy (Argentina or Hong Kong) and the 
respective governing currency country (the United States) to measure the expected   7 
rate of depreciation.
6
The pressure to devivate for Argentina and Hong Kong are plotted in Figure 1 
and Figure 2, respectively. Figure 1 shows that the expectation of devaluation was 
high at the time of the adoption of Argentina’s currency board in 1991. Interest rate 
differential was about 200% in the quarter before the currency board was established, 
implying high devaluation pressure. Then, the pressure fell sharply as the interest rate 
differential  was stable around 0% throughout the 1990s. The currency board 
effectively reduced devaluation pressure for a full decade after its implementation.  
Nonetheless, devaluation pressure begins  to creep back up beginning in 2001, as 
evidenced by the growing interest rate differential.  By the time  Argentina 
abandoned the currency board in January 2002, the interest rate differential had 
increased back to 38%. 
 
Figure 1: Interest rate differential between Argentina and the US 
  More specifically, π  =  idomestic  –  iUS. Following Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002), we use the money market rate to measure the interest rate. We use 3 
Month Money Market Rate for Argentina, 3 Month Hong Kong Interbank Offer Rate 
(HIBOR) for Hong Kong and Fed fund rate for the US. A positive (negative) value of 
the interest differential indicates a pressure towards devaluation (appreciation) as 
suggested by the uncovered interest rate parity condition. 
 
 
Note: Interest rate differential is computed by iARG-iUS.   
                                                 
6  Jeanne and Masson (2000) argue that the interest rate differential is a direct estimate of 
devaluation probability 
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The sample period is from January 1991 to December 2005. 
 
Figure 2: Interest rate differential between Hong Kong and the US 
 
Note: Interest rate differential is computed by iHK-iUS.   
The sample period is from January 1983 to December 2005. 
 
In Figure 2, we observe that Hong Kong experienced several episodes of high 
devaluation pressure, including the onset of the currency board (1983-84), the first 
Gulf war (1990-92) and the Asian financial crisis (1997). On the other hand, there 
were periods with pressure to appreciate, such as the 1987 stock market crash (when 
the 3 Month HIBOR dropped to less than 2%) and a recent period from 2000 to 2003. 
Furthermore, the volatility of the expected rate of depreciation became smaller after 
the Asian Financial Crisis. Gerlach (2005) reaches consistent results using daily data 
from 1998 to 2001, and suggests that this is due to a calmer external environment and 
the increased credibility of the HKMA. 
 
The economic fundamentals that we consider include the fiscal balance to GDP 
ratio (fiscal), trade balance to GDP ratio (trade), real exchange rate (rer, expressed by 
the ratio of CPI in the home country to CPI in the US), unemployment rate 
(unemployment), inflation rate (inflation) and real GDP growth rate (real_growth). 
Fiscal captures the consistency between fiscal policy and the objective of maintaining 
the currency board. In the case of Hong Kong, as shown in Figure 3a, the average 
fiscal balance from 1982 to 2005 was about 3% of GDP. This suggests that 
government finances have been consistent with the currency board arrangement in 
-6%
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10%  9 
Hong Kong. 
 
 
Figure 3a: Fiscal Balance to GDP ratio of Hong Kong, 1982-2005 
 
 
  On the other hand, there was inconsistency  between  fiscal policy  and the 
currency board arrangement in Argentina. The government deficit was about 1.4% of   
GDP during the period 1991-2001. Moreover, as shown in Figure 3b, the fiscal 
balance deteriorated over time, which worsen the credibility of the currency board.   
 
Figure 3a: Fiscal Balance to GDP of Argentina, 1991-2001 
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We consider two indicators of the external sector. We use trade to capture the 
overall performance of the external sector, and employ rer  to measure the 
competitiveness of domestic production. A high trade surplus implies a net inflow of 
foreign capital into the domestic economy, which provides foreign reserve to defend 
the currency peg. Similarly, a positive trade surplus can be achieved by depreciating 
the real exchange rate.   
 
Figure 4a shows that the real exchange rate of Hong Kong appreciated and the 
trade surplus deteriorated over the 15 years following the adoption of the currency 
board. After the Asian Financial Crisis, the real exchange rate depreciated and hence 
the trade deficit diminished. Figure 4b shows the real exchange rate of Argentina and 
the ratio of trade balance to GDP over the period 1991-2002. The real exchange rate 
appreciated during the period 1991 to 1993, and the trade balance deteriorated. After 
the Mexican Peso crisis, the real exchange rate depreciated, but the trade deficit only 
diminished slightly, becoming a surplus by 2001. 
 
Figure 4a: Trade Surplus and Real Exchange Rate of Hong Kong, 1982-2005 
 
 
Figure 4b: Trade Surplus and Real Exchange Rate of Argentina, 1991-2001 
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Finally, we measure internal economic performance using the unemployment 
rate, inflation rate and real GDP growth rate. The evolution of the first two of these 
two variables is shown in Figure 5a for Hong Kong and Figure 5b for Argentina. In 
the early 1980s, Hong Kong experienced a high inflation rate and unemployment rate. 
After the adoption of the currency board, a negative relationship between the inflation 
rate and the unemployment rate became more apparent. After the Asian Financial 
Crisis, the unemployment rate increased and the economy faced a period of deflation. 
Consistent with our evidence, Genberg and Pauwels (2004a, b) report that Okun’s law 
and a Phillip’s curve relationship have held in Hong Kong since the establishment of 
the currency board.
7
  In the case of Argentina, the inflation rate dropped dramatically from 1991 to 
1993, which suggests that the currency board was successful in controlling inflation. 
However, the unemployment rate increased over the sample period. Bleaney (2004) 
argues that this was one of the underlying forces of the collapse of the currency board 
in Argentina. 
 
Figure 5a: Inflation Rate and Unemployment Rate of Hong Kong, 1982-2005 
 
 
                                                 
7  Okun’s law shows that there is a negative relationship between output gap and unemployment rate 
and the Phillip’s curve shows that there is a negative relationship between inflation rate and 
unemployment rate, in brief. 
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Figure 5b: Inflation Rate and Unemployment Rate of Argentina, 1991-2001 
 
 
4 Empirical Models 
We employ the Markov switching model, developed in Hamilton (1989) and 
applied in Jeanne and Masson (2000), to detect switches between periods with low 
and high probabilities of devaluation. Let πt denote the expected devaluation at time t. 
For expositional purpose, we use the term expected devaluation for the rest of the 
paper even though π<0  indicates an expectation of appreciation. The expected 
devaluation depends on the unobserved realization of a stochastic process. Let st 
denote the realization at time t, which takes value zero (for good state) or one (for bad 
state).    The  expected  devaluation  are  α0  and  α0+αd  in the good  and  bad  state, 
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respectively. Conceptually, the switching parameters need not be restricted to the 
intercept of the model. We pursue this parsimonious model because of the small 
sample size afforded by the quarterly data. The model of two states is also suggested 
in Jeanne (1997), which derives a theoretical framework with two stable dynamic 
equilibria when multiple equilibria arise. Our model can be written as   
 
πt = α0 + αdst + xtβ + εt 
 
where εt is identically and independently distributed with mean zero and variance σ
2 
and xt={fiscalt, tradet, rert, unemploymentt, inflationt, real growtht}. We assume that 
the state variable, st, follows a first-order 2-state Markov chain, i.e. the economy is in 
one of the two possible states at each point in time. Denote the transition probability 
from state i to state j as Pr[st=j|st=i] where i,j=0,1.  We assume that the transition 
probabilities between the two states are constants such that Pr [st=0|st=0]=p and Pr 
[st=1|st=1]=q. 
 
This further implies that the unconditional probabilities of being in state 0 and 
state 1 at any time are also constant and are given by 
 
q p
q
St − −
−
= =
2
1
] 0 Pr[  
q p
p
St − −
−
= =
2
1
] 1 Pr[  
 
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood as proposed in Hamilton (1989). We 
use the likelihood ratio test proposed by Hansen (1992, 1996) to test the two-state 
switching model against the fundamental model with no state swtiching. That is, we 
test the null hypothesis that  0 = d α . A likelihood ratio test of this null hypothesis 
does not have the usual limiting chi-squared distribution, because the parameters p 
and q are unidentified under the null. Thus, we cannot employ the standard likelihood 
ratio (LR) test directly. Hansen (1992, 1996)’s test provides an upper bound to the 
asymptotic distribution of standardized likelihood ratio statistics, even when 
conventional regularity conditions (such as unidentified parameters) are violated.   14 
Garcia (1998) provides the adjustment of critical values for a set of specific two-state 
models. We calculate Hansen's test for all models under the null hypothesis of no 
state-switching, using a four-lag Newey-West correction. The standardized likelihood 
ratio tests and their corresponding p-values are reported in Table 3. 
 
5 Empirical Results 
5.1 Fundamental Model 
We first ignore variations in government credibility and estimate the impact of 
economic fundamentals on  devaluation pressure (as indicated by interest rate 
differential). The parameter estimates and associated standard errors are presented in 
Table 2. This  model performs poorly across the sample countries. In the case of 
Argentina, it shows that only the coefficient on trade is statistically significant. On the 
other hand, the coefficients on rer, unemployment and real growth are statistically 
significant in the case of Hong Kong. 
 
The estimates from the fundamental model suggest that the currency board of 
Argentina did not experience pressure to readjust its official exchange rate, whereas 
that of Hong Kong experienced pressure to devalue. The results for Argentina are 
particularly counter-intuitive, as Argentina failed to maintain its currency board after 
2001. In an ex post sense, the collapse of the currency board of Argentina was due to 
a currency attack, so that there should have been higher devaluation pressure on the 
currency board. Thus, the constant term in the regression is expected to be positive, 
which is not the case in Table 2. 
 
One possible explanation for the poor performance of the fundamental model in 
capturing the devaluation probability is that the model may be mis-specified. 
Consistent with Obstfeld (1996) and related studies, changes in market expectations 
of the sustainability of the fixed exchange rate play an important role in determining 
the pressure to devaluate. In other words, changes in expected devaluation are 
associated with the perceived credibility of the central bank to maintain the currency 
board. In order to capture the effect of expectations, we estimate the model under the 
assumption that there are multiple equilibria. 
   15 
5.2 Markov Switching Model 
Using the Hansen (1992, 1996) standardized LR test, we reject the hypothesis 
that government credibility does not vary over time.  This suggests that the Markov 
switching model more accurately describes the dynamics of a currency board than the 
fundamental model.     We infer that the currency boards of Argentina and Hong 
Kong experience self-fulfilling behavior. Expectations are an important factor in 
determining the credibility of the currency board.   
Looking closer into the case of Argentina, the estimation results in Table 2 show 
that none of the regressors related to economic fundamentals are statistically 
significant and that only the intercept term in the bad state is statistically significant, 
with the expected positive sign. There is no expected depreciation in a state of low 
devaluation pressure; whereas the changes in expectation due to self-fulfilling 
behavior induce 41% (i.e. α0+αd) expected depreciation in a state of high devaluation 
pressure. Moreover, the implied average duration of low states and high states are 1 
quarter and 50 quarters, respectively. This indicates that the currency board in 
Argentina experienced persistently high devaluation pressure.. These results suggest 
that the currency crisis in Argentina could have been driven by self-fulfilling behavior, 
which is related to the credibility of the government rather than economic 
fundamentals. This interpretation is further supported by the fact that currency 
premium can be substantial even with hard pegs if they are not fully credible 
(Edwards, 2000). 
 
Within a Markov switching model, it is possible to estimate  how likely  the 
currency is to face more or less devaluation pressure over time, as measured by 
transition probability.  Figure 6a shows  the probability of the Argentina Peso 
entering into a bad (high devaluation) state, where the currency board will lack 
credibility.  These  estimates  are derived from the estimated Markov Switching 
model. The probability of being in the bad state decreased upon the adoption of the 
currency board, (although the probability was still higher than one half for the first 
four years of the currency board). Beginning in 1995, the currency board maintained a 
high level of credibility for several years (as the probabililty of being in bad state kept 
declinging since 1995). However, the probability of getting to the bad state increased 
dramatically since 2001, which is a year before the collapse of the currency board. 
   16 
Figure 6a: Smoothed Probability of high devaluation for Argentina 
 
 
Furthermore, the results of Hansen’s LR test show that the currency board of 
Hong Kong exhibits self-fulfilling behavior, even though the currency board has been 
in place since 1983. Moreover, the currency board system in Hong Kong faces a 
pressure of devaluation of 3% (i.e. α0) and 6% (i.e. α0+αd) in the low and high states 
of devaluation, respectively. Although Hong Kong experiences a slight devaluation 
pressure even in the low state, the credibility of Hong Kong’s currency board is not 
greatly affected by the self-fulfilling behavior. The implied average duration of low 
state and high state are 12 quarters and 1 quarter, respectively. Comparing these two 
economies, the lack of credibility in Argentina may have been associated with the 
weak economic conditions such as lack of fiscal discipline, deteriorating balance of 
payments and rigidity of labor market regulations. 
 
Figure 6b plots the smoothed regime probabilities for the expected depreciation 
of Hong Kong. The probability of being in the high devaluation pressure was high 
during the period of 1984-1990. Since 1990, the credibility of the currency board of 
Hong Kong became strong and the probability of being in the state of high 
devaluation is almost non-existent, except during a five-year period after the Asian 
Financial Crisis. Interestingly, Crosby (2004) reports that, during the period 
1974-2000, the output volatility was the lowest during 1989 to 1995. It suggests that 
the low output volatility did not realized until the currency board build up its 
credibility. 
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Figure 6b: Smoothed Probability of high devaluation for Hong Kong 
 
 
Among all the regressors, the coefficients on trade, rer and  inflation  for the 
switching model for Hong Kong are statistically significant. The signs are reasonable, 
with real exchange rate depreciation, higher trade balance to GDP ratios and higher 
inflation rates reducing the pressure of devaluation. In order to ascertain the economic 
significance of the estimation results, we compare the impact of each variable on the 
expected depreciation. Since these regressors are of different units, comparing their 
respective marginal impact by their regression coefficients is misleading. We therefore 
normalize the estimates to allow for direct comparison as follow. We normalize by 
multiplying the respective regression coefficient by one standard deviation of the 
independent variable. The results answer the following question: how much will 
devaluation pressure change if there is a one standard deviation change in that 
variable? This approach of normalization views the independent variables as choice 
variables by the policy maker, and examines the impacts of the policy change on the 
expected rate of depreciation. Using this normalization, we find that the real exchange 
rate is the most important driving force of the credibility of the Hong Kong currency 
board, followed by the inflation rate and the trade balance. For a one percent 
appreciation in real exchange rate of Hong Kong relative to the US, the expected 
depreciation falls by 64%. Similarly, a one percent increase in inflation and trade 
balance-to-GDP ratio increases the expected depreciation by 31% and 16%, 
respectively.   
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  The estimated regression results allow us to compute the counterfactual expected 
depreciation as a function of the observed economic fundamentals. In this exercise, 
we model a good (low devaluation pressure) state throughout the sample periods in 
order to isolate the effects from the changes in market expectations. In other words, 
we examine the case where people do not experience the bad state arrive over the 
sample period. Accordingly, the counterfactual interest rate differential is the fitted 
value of interest rate differential at the good state (with the coefficient on the Markov 
switching parameter set to zero) from the Markov Switching Model.. In Figure 7a, we 
plot the actual and counterfactual expected depreciations for Hong Kong over the 
sample. The actual and counterfactual expected depreciations diverge during the 
period 1994 to 1999. This suggests that market expectations were a driving force 
behind devaluation pressures, rather than economic fundamentals.  The high 
expected depreciation during the Asian Financial Crisis is mainly driven by the 
self-fulfilling nature of market expectations. Furthermore, the actual and 
counterfactual expected depreciations track one another more closely after 2003, 
which suggests a re-establishment of confidence in the currency board. In aggregate, 
this demonstrates that while proper execution of economic fundamentals is important, 
lack of credibility can often undermine a currency that would otherwise survive. 
 
Figure 7a: Actual and Counterfactual Expected Depreciations in HK, 1983-2004 
 
 
The actual and counterfactual expected depreciations of Argentina are plotted in 
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Figure 7b. Although the economic fundamentals are not statistically significant in the 
regression, the predicted depreciation fits the actual expected depreciation quite well 
over the sample period. There are several periods with high expected depreciation due 
to market expectations, including the early period of the currency board, the Mexican 
Peso crisis in December 1994 and the period before the collapse of the currency board. 
The expected depreciations during these periods are higher than those predicted from 
the economic fundamentals. This suggests that self-fulfilling behavior tended to drive 
expected depreciation. 
 
Figure 7b: Actual and Counterfactual Expected Depreciation of Argentina, 
1991-2001 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
This paper has examined the determinants of the sustainability of the currency 
boards of Argentina and Hong Kong. We suggest that that the failure of the Argentine 
currency board in 2001 was largely due to the lack of credibility in keeping the 
currency board functioning, which made the currency board highly vulnerable to 
expectation changes. On the other hand, in the case of Hong Kong, our empirical 
results suggest that this economy has experienced a credibility problem, but that the 
effects of expectations changes are not yet strong enough to cause the collapse of the 
currency board. Although economic fundamentals are strong enough to maintain the 
currency board, the government should be careful in managing market expectations. 
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Future research can investigate the sustainability of fixed exchange rates in a boarder 
context to include less extreme forms of fixed exchange rate systems such as a 
crawling peg.  21 
Table 2: Parameter estimates 
  Fundamental Model 
 
Markov switch Model 
 
ARG  HK 
 
ARG  HK 
Constant  -16.5 
(33.9) 
3.5*** 
(1.02) 
     
Good state        -24.3 
(25.3) 
3.31*** 
(0.53) 
Difference between 
good and high state       
41.3*** 
(3.15) 
2.82*** 
(0.34) 
Fiscal  -0.83 
(5.23) 
0.03 
(0.06) 
 
-4.44 
(3.94) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
trade  8.83* 
(5.34) 
0.04 
(0.27) 
 
1.66 
(1.78) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
Real exchange rate  37.9 
(33.5) 
-0.43*** 
(0.09) 
 
38.1 
(25.7) 
-0.39*** 
(0.07) 
Unemployment  -1.00 
(0.62) 
0.11** 
(0.04) 
 
-0.39 
(0.45) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
Inflation  -0.03 
(0.05) 
0.14 
(0.11) 
 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.06** 
(0.03)   22 
Real GDP growth  -0.36 
(0.29) 
-0.05* 
(0.03) 
 
-0.15 
(0.14) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
Implied high state 
     
16.9  6.7 
P 
     
0.03 
(0.007) 
0.97 
(0.19) 
Q 
     
0.98 
(0.023) 
0.66 
(0.017) 
Note: ARG and HK are Argentina and Hong Kong, respectively.   
The specification for fundamental model is t t t x ε β α π + + = 0 , whereas that of the Markov 
switching model is  t t t d t x s ε β α α π + + + = 0 . The fundamental models with a constant intercept 
term whereas the Markov switching models with state dependent intercept term. The implied high state 
is computed by  0 α + d α . 
We denote the estimates at 10% significance level by *, at 5% significance level **, and at 1% 
significance level ***. 
 
   23 
Table 3: Hansen’s standardized LR test 
  ARG  HK 
LR  2.86  3.97 
M=0  0.053  0.002 
M=1  0.090  0.011 
M=2  0.100  0.02 
M=3  0.093  0.021 
M=4  0.102  0.03 
Note: See Hansen (1996) for details of the test statistic, such as the definition of M.   
The row from M=0 to M=4 are p-values of the LR test statistics. 
   24 
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Data Appendix: 
The data that we used in the study is obtained from the IFS, IMF database. 
  Exchange Rate in the database is denominated as home currency to US. Line 
RF…ZF 
  Interest rate differential: Line 60B…ZF (subtract by the governing currency 
countries’ counter part) 
  Fiscal deficit: Line 80...ZF divided by Line 99B…ZF 
  Trade balance: Line 78ACDZF multiple by Line RF…ZF and divided by Line 
99B..ZF 
  Real exchange rate, rer: Line 64..ZF (divided by the governing currency 
countries’ counter part) 
  Inflation rate (inflation): Line 64..ZF(Converted to yearly inflation rate by 
subtracting the same quarter from the previous year) 
  Unemployment (unemployment): Line 67R...ZF 
  Real GDP_gr: Line 99BVPZF (Converted to yearly real GDP growth by 
subtracting the same quarter from the previous year) WORKING PAPERS 
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